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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Regardless what the legislaturq entitled the act, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1953) is a statute of repose.

The legisla-

ture enacted this measure to address the problem of increasing
costs of liability insurance caused, in part, by the insurance
industry's concern about liability for product-related injuries
which might occur long after the date of manufacture or sale of a
product.

The legislature did not intend to replace existing sta-

tutes of limitation which operated to bat actions by persons who,
although aware of their injuries, nevertheless slept on their
rights.

Indeed, to interpret the statute of repose as a measure

allowing the plaintiff here to delay filing his claim would be
directly contrary to the legislature's purpose "to expedite early
evaluation

and

settlement

of

claims."

(Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 78-15-2(3) (1953)).
Plaintiff erroneously bases hi$ position on mechanical
application of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953) and rigid reliance
on inapplicable maxims of statutory construction.

He has not

cited a single case in which a court addressing the ultimate issue
has supported his position.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TITLE OF THE ACT DOES NOT CONTROL
THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE.

The plaintiff argues that Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1953)
is a statute of limitation, because the title of the act contains
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the phrase, "establishing

a statute of limitations."

However,

this Court has previously recognized that the title of an act does
not control the meaning of the statute where the language of the
statute

is

unambiguous.

State Tax Commission,

16

(American Smelting & Refining Co. v.
Utah

2d

147,

150;

397

P.2d

67, 70

(1964)).
In

Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,

717

P.2d

670

(Utah

1985), this Court concluded that Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1953)
was a statute of repose because the time period commenced to run
upon the occurrence of an event other than the date of injury
giving rise to the cause of action and because the statute was not
designed to allow a reasonable time within which to file an action
once a cause of action accrued.

Since the statutory language is

unambiguous, the legislature's designation of the statute as a
statute of limitation is not controlling.
POINT II:

A.

IN ENACTING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE,
THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO
PREEMPT STATUTES OF LIMITATION
WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BAR AN INJURED
PARTY'S CLAIM.

The legislature enacted the statute of repose to address a
perceived problem of rising insurance rates.
The Utah Legislature stated its purpose for enacting the

Utah Products Liability Act in Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-2 (1953),
expressing its concern about the rising number of suits and size
of judgments rendered in product liability actions and perceiving
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that these actions had an adverse impact on the cost and availability of liability insurance.

One of the principal factors contri-

buting to the rise in insurance rates was the continuing risk of
liability for injuries caused by products long after the product's
date

of manufacture

insurance

industry's

or

sale.

concern

One
about

coirpnentator
thjis

"tail

summarized
exposure"

follows:
The threat of claims based on injuries caused
by older products is cited as one of the most
significant causes of the increased insurance
rates.
A products liability insurance policy
typically covers all products claims made
during the period that the policy is in force.
While manufacturers and their insurers are subject to claims involving products manufactured
during the present insurance period, they are
also liable for injuries stemming from previously manufactured products.
Therefore,
well-established manufacturers of long-lasting
products are exposed to a great degree of risk
due to large numbers of previously manufactured
products that are still in use. Many old products were produced during the time when the
public was less safety-conscious than it is now
and before manufacturers faced governmental
pressures to produce safe products. Many manufacturers are facing claims based on products
that were built prior to the advent of modern
principles of strict tort liability. Although
the number of claims actually predicated upon
old products represents a very s^riall portion of
the total number of products liability claims,
the potential for liability from these old products has created a considerable concern on the
part of insurers that is reflected in higher
premiums.
Note, Alabama's Products Liability Statute of Repose, 11
Cumberland L. Rev. 163, 166 (1980).
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the
as

The Utah Legislature enacted the statute of repose, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-15-3
exposure."

(1953), to redress the problem of "tail

The legislature intended to reduce uncertainty and

risk by immunizing manufacturers and persons in their chains of
distribution six years after sale or ten years after manufacture
of their products.
B.

In contrast to statutes of repose, statutes of limitation
focus on the behavior of the injured party once the cause of
action arises.
As noted in the defendants1 opening brief, the legisla-

ture enacts statutes of limitation to protect defendants from
stale claims asserted after evidence is lost, memories have faded,
and witnesses have disappeared.
the law to encourage

It has long been the policy of

injured parties who are aware of their

injuries to submit their claims for early resolution.

The sole

focus of a statute of limitation is upon the behavior of the
injured party.

If an injured person does not act timely, the per-

son waives his or her remedy.
A commentator emphasized the difference in focus between
statutes of repose and statutes of limitation as follows:
Historically, statutes of limitation prevented
plaintiffs from sleeping on their legal rights
to the detriment of defendants. The focus in
the traditional statutes was upon the conduct
of the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff did not
bring his cause of action in a timely manner,
the statute of limitations deprived him of the
opportunity to seek judicial redress for an
otherwise valid claim.
Statutes of repose,
however, focus on the age of a product rather
than on the plaintiff's conduct. They absolu-
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tely bar all claims when products exceed the
statutory age limitation and completely deprive
a plaintiff of his rights merely because he has
been injured by an older product.
Dickson, The Statute of Limitations
Liability Act;

in North Dakota's Products

An Exercise in Futility?, 5 9 N.D. L. Rev. 552,

556-557 (1983).
Because the premises underlying the two types of statutes
differ, the enactment of one type of statute does not automatically

repeal

previously

enacted

Certainly, that is the case here.

statutes

of

the

other

type.

Obviously, tfie legislature's

desire to enact a measure to curb rising insurance rates did not
supplant

or

eliminate

the

legislature's

previously

expressed

policy that injured parties, well aware of their injuries, must
bring their actions timely or waive their remedies.
C.

Plaintiff's contention is contrary t<^ the legislature's
expressed intent.
In Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-2 (3) (1953) , the Utah Legis-

lature stated its intent to enact measures "to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." [Emphasis added.]

However, the

plaintiff has taken the incongruous position that these legislative measures actually validate his delay in presenting his claim
for evaluation and resolution.

Plaintiff attempts to support this

anomalous position by inviting the Court to mechanically

apply

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953) or indiscriminately employ maxims
of statutory construction.
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POINT III:

A.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-1 (1953) DOES NOT
PRECLUDE OPERATION OF THE TWO YEAR
LIMITATION ON THIS WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION.

Statutes must not be mechanically applied according to their
literal terms without reasoned analysis.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953) reads as follows:
Civil actions can be commenced only within the
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the
cause of action shall have accrued, except
where in special cases a different limitation
is prescribed by statute.

The plaintiff argues that the Utah Products Liability Act statute
of repose is a special case prescribing a different limitation.
Although

the

argument

has

superficial

appeal,

it

does

not

withstand reasoned analysis.
In Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964),
this Court notssd that mechanical application of a statute in the
absence of proper analysis may

lead to anomalous results.

In

Snyder, the plaintiff sought damages from a non-resident motorist
for

personal

injuries

suffered

in

an

automobile

accident.

Although the plaintiff filed her action after the four-year limitation period

had run, she argued

that the action was timely,

because the literal terms of a tolling statute appeared to apply
to actions against non-residents.

After observing that the plain-

tiff could have served process on the lieutenant governor as agent
for the non-motorist under the non-resident motorist statute any
time during the four year period, the Court commented:
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It is to be conceded that upon a superficial
look at the above section [Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-35 (1953)], ignoring all other considerations, its literal wording might seem to
indicate that where a defendant departs from
the state after a cause of action arises, the
time of his absence should not be counted as
part of the time of limitation. But statutes
of necessity must state their objectives in
general language. It is not always possible to
foresee and prescribe in precise detail for all
situations to which they might apply. Attempts
to give them universal and literal application
frequently lead to incongruous results which
were never intended. When it is obvious that
this is so, the statute should not be so
applied.
15 Utah 2d at pp. 255; 390 P.2d at pp. 913-916. Just as the Court
in Snyder refused to superficially examine and mechanically apply
the tolling provision, so should the Court here refrain from
applying the literal terms of Utah Cod£ Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953)
without proper analysis.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953) particularly illustrates
the principle that the legislature cannot always foresee in precise detail all situations to which the sftatute might apply.

The

legislature enacted the Utah Products Liability Act in 1977. This
enactment responded to a movement promoting statutes of repose
which started in the late 1950fs and earl^ 1960fs.
Variety,

Policy

and

Constitutionality

of

(McGovern, The

Product

Liability

Statutes of Repose, 30 Am. U.L. Rev. 579, 587 (1981)).

By

contrast, the language now appearing as btah Code Ann. § 78-12-1
(1953) has been the law of Utah since 1876, having been previously

- 7-

designated as Comp. Laws 1876 § 1095; 2 Comp. Laws 1888 § 3129;
R.S. 1898 § 2855; Comp. Laws 1907 § 2855; Utah Code Ann. § 104-2-1
(1943); and Utah Code Ann. § 104-12-1 (1943 Supp.).

Obviously,

the legislature in 1876 did not envision the emergence of modern
statutes of repose, and a mechanical application of the statute
leads to the type of incongruous result against which this Court
warned in Snyder.
B.

The legislature's intent in enacting the Utah Product
Liability Act statute of repose determines the applicability
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953).
In

Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp.,

609

P.2d

934

(Utah

1980), the plaintiff, who had not timely filed a medical malpractice action against the defendant, asserted that a tolling provision

must

be

read

in

conjunction

with

the

limitation

prescribed by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.

period

After citing

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-1 (1953), the Court stated that in order to
determine whether subsequent legislation superseded existing provisions

of Title

78, Chapter

12, the Court must consider

legislative motive in enacting the subsequent legislation.
P.2d

at 936).

Product

the
(609

Because the legislature did not intend the Utah

Liability

Act

statutes of limitations

statute

of repose to supersede

existing

in the circumstances of this case (see

discussion in Point II), Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953) does not
applyf and the two year limitation on wrongful death actions, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-L2-28(2) (1953), bars the plaintiff's claim.
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POINT IV:

A.

THE PLAINTIFFfS RELIANCE ON MAXIMS OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IS MISPLACED AND
IGNORES THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT IN
ENACTING THE UTAH PRODUCT LIABILITY
ACT.

The plaintiff bases his argument on a fatally flawed assumption.
The plaintiff argues that statutory construction prin-

ciples mandate the conclusion that the two-year wrongful death
limitation does not bar his action.

Hi^ argument commences with

the assumption that statutes of limitation and statutes of repose
are indistinguishable and interchangeable.

The argument proceeds

on a corollary to his assumption—statutory construction principles used to choose between two competihg statutes of limitation
can also be used to choose between a statute of repose and a statute of limitation.

As demonstrated in the defendants1 opening

brief and Points I and II heref the plaintiff's assumption is
erroneous, thus invalidating

the succeeding corollary and the

resulting conclusion.
B.

Maxims of statutory construction do not have the force of law
and are useful only if they assist in ascertaining the
legislature's intent.
This Court has always cautioned that statutory construc-

tion principles are only means to an end and do not have the force
of law.

In Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738 (Utah

1977), Salt Lake County asserted that it was entitled to collect
fees from Salt Lake City under a statutory interpretation based on
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recognized statutory maxims.

In addressing the countyfs argument,

the Court stated:
But helpful as rules of construction often are,
they are useful guides, but poor masters; and
they should not be regarded as having any such
rigidity as to have the force of law, or
distort an otherwise natural meaning or intent.
Their only ligitimate function is to assist in
ascertaining the true intent and purpose of the
statute.
Id. at p. 741.

The legislature's intent in enacting the Utah

Products Liability Act is clear from the legislature's own stated
intent, the perceived problem it addressed, and the statutory
device it employed to resolve the problem.
II).

(See discussion Point

Because the legislature's intent is clear, there is no need

to resort to the maxims of dubious applicability upon which the
plaintiff so rigidly relies.
POINT V:

THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO CITE A
SINGLE CASE SUPPORTING HIS POSITION ON
THE ULTIMATE ISSUE PRESENTED BY THIS
CROSS-APPEAL.

The plaintiff has taken issue with the cases cited by the
defendants in which courts have held that a statute of repose does
not extend to time to file an action beyond the time permitted by
the applicable statute of limitation.

Although

these courts

interpreted architects', builders', and engineers' statutes, they
rendered their decisions based on principles applicable to all
statutes of repose. That such universal principles exist is amply
demonstrated by Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah
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1985) in which this Court surveyed decisions interpreting architects1, builders1, engineers1 and medical malpractice statutes of
repose as well as product liability statutes.

(See, 717 P.2d at

677-678).
Although the plaintiff argues that the defendants1 cases
do not apply to product liability statutes of repose, he has
utterly failed to cite any case interpreting any statute of repose
which supports his position on the ultimate issue presented by
this cross-appeal.

Indeed, to defendants1 knowledge, such a case

does not exist.
CONCLUSION
Because the Utah Legislature ijiever intended the Utah
Product Liability Act statute of repose to extend the time in
which the plaintiff could file his action^ the defendants respectfully submit that the Court should reverse the trial court's April
28, 1983 order.
DATED this _^__ day of September, 1986.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

/ *'\

By

s

-'^> ">[ * / "

L. Rich Humpherys
M. Douglas Bayly
Attorneys for Defendants Saab
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